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Ten years have lapsed since the Jali Commission’s final report became publicly available, and 
it is therefore an opportune time to assess the state of South Africa’s prison system. The Jali 
Commission was appointed when it became clear that the state had lost control of the Department 
of Correctional Services (DCS). A decade on, some notable advances have been made in regaining 
control, and addressing corruption and maladministration. However, serious and persistent 
challenges remain. These are explored in this article, with a particular focus on policy development, 
the performance of the DCS against set targets, governance and human rights violations. In all four 
of these areas substantial shortcomings remain. Impunity for human rights violations is perhaps the 
most critical challenge, as the DCS has been reluctant to acknowledge the scale of this problem or 




In 2001, president Thabo Mbeki established 
the Jali Commission of Inquiry into Corruption 
and Maladministration in the Department of 
Correctional Services (‘Jali Commission’). 
Before the establishment of the Jali Commission 
there had been at least 20 investigations into 
irregularities and abuses within the department.1 
In 2000 it was reported to Parliament that 
the state had lost control of the Department 
of Correctional Services (DCS).2 It was in this 
context, and at the request of the then minister 
of Correctional Services, Ben Skosana of 
the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP), that Mbeki 
established the Jali Commission in 2001. 
In 2005 the Jali Commission submitted its 
full report with recommendations to Mbeki. 
Following much pressure from the Portfolio 
Committee on Correctional Services and 
Judge Jali himself, then minister Ngconde 
Balfour released the report to the public in 
November 2006. The findings were damning 
of the department’s conduct as it related to 
corruption, maladministration and the treatment 
of prisoners. Nearly 10 years on it is opportune 
to assess the state of South Africa’s DCS and 
the prison system itself. 
This brief article provides an overview of 
the South African prison system post-Jali 
Commission, focusing on four key issues: 
policy development, delivery on set targets, 
governance and corruption, and human rights. 
Using the commission as a reference point, 
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it provides a succinct overview of the most 
noteworthy developments within the DCS, or 
lack thereof, over the past 10 years. 
The Jali Commission had a particular scope. 
It examined, for example, only nine of the 
department’s 52 management areas as well as 
specific focal areas defined in the commission’s 
terms of reference.3 The mandate given to 
the commission was indicative of the scale 
and scope of corruption, maladministration 
and rights violations in the DCS. It included 
investigations into the procurement of goods 
and services; the recruitment, appointment, 
promotion and dismissal of employees; the 
treatment of prisoners, dishonest practices 
and illicit relationships between employees and 
prisoners, leading to unlawful activities; alleged 
incidents of non-adherence to departmental 
policy and deviation from national norms 
and standards; alleged incidents of violence 
against or intimidation of employees; and 
to what extent recommendations from past 
investigations relating to the department had 
been implemented. 
While it is acknowledged that there have been 
some notable improvements in the decade 
since the commission submitted its report, 
especially when assessed against the crises-
engulfed DCS of the late 1990s, many also 
argue that imprisonment has not fundamentally 
changed since apartheid. On the positive side, 
great strides have been made to rid the DCS of 
high level corruption and to re-establish state 
control over the department. Supply chain 
management was improved, a new disciplinary 
code was established, corrupt officials were 
dismissed and large-scale training of staff was 
undertaken, to name just a few improvements. 
However, in respect of familiar problems such as 
human rights violations, legislative compliance, 
conditions of detention and access to much 
needed services, far less has been achieved. 
The National Development Plan (NDP) provides 
guidance on the reforms necessary to ensure 
South Africa’s criminal justice system is 
democratic and fair.4 The NDP asks, among 
other things, for the criminal justice system 
to have a single set of objectives, priorities 
and performance measurement targets; a 
demilitarised, professional police service that is 
sensitive to community needs; an inter-sectoral 
approach to safety; and a particular focus on 
vulnerable groups in society.5 There is, however, 
scant evidence in the annual reports of the 
justice and security cluster departments that any 
substantial realignment has taken place.
Policy development
The White Paper review
The highly anticipated 2005 White Paper 
on Corrections in South Africa (the ‘White 
Paper’) was in part drafted in response to the 
Jali Commission, but was widely criticised.6 
Policy development has not been one of the 
department’s strengths, as illustrated in Sloth-
Nielsen’s comprehensive overview of the 
erratic and at times illogical nature of policy 
development in the DCS at the time.7 The White 
Paper identified the rehabilitation of offenders 
as the ‘core business’ of the department. This 
was seen as misguided, given the serious and 
fundamental challenges facing the DCS, such 
as poorly skilled staff, overcrowding and gross 
human rights abuses – issues clearly identified 
by the Jali Commission. Eight years later, in 
April 2013, the DCS informed the parliamentary 
Portfolio Committee on Correctional Services 
that a review of the White Paper would be 
undertaken and that it would be completed by 
the end of that year.8 By August 2015 nothing 
had been delivered.9 
From the available literature it is not clear why 
the White Paper review project seems to have 
been abandoned, especially as the DCS, the 
Portfolio Committee and civil society institutions 
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acknowledged the need for it. The 2005 draft 
and final White Paper brought a sense of 
purpose to the department, despite criticism 
that it was too ambitious and at odds with 
the realities of South Africa’s prisons.10 With 
the White Paper having thus suffered a further 
serious blow to its credibility, the question 
arises as to what directs policy development 
in the DCS. It is clear from departmental 
communications that the White Paper no longer 
enjoys the same prominence it once did. The 
need for a review remains, because, as will 
be discussed below, some problems have 
remained persistently familiar. 
Remand detention
In commenting on overcrowding in correctional 
facilities, the Jali Commission paid scant 
attention to the plight of awaiting trial prisoners. 
At the time the commission regarded the 
inspecting judge (the late Judge Hannes Fagan) 
as an adequate champion for the rights of 
remand detainees.11 The commission was, 
however, concerned about the department’s 
attitude towards overcrowding. The department 
blamed the police for the large awaiting trial 
population, and expressed the wish that 
awaiting trial prisoners be detained at police 
stations.12 A policy framework on remand 
detention, as it became known, was not a 
priority for the Jali Commission. 
Subsequently, the White Paper on Remand 
Detention Management in South Africa (the 
‘Remand White Paper’) was released in March 
2014, after extensive amendments to the 
Correctional Services Act 1998 (Act 111 of 
1998) by means of the Correctional Matters 
Amendment Act 2011 (Act 5 of 2011). The 
Remand White Paper describes in detail the 
management of remand detainees, their rights 
and responsibilities, as well as cooperation 
between different government departments 
around remand detention. The language and 
detailed prescripts are akin to the departmental 
standing orders, known as the ‘B-Orders’, which 
provide step-by-step guidance on nearly every 
aspect of DCS operations and are intended to 
be a central resource to officials. In overview, the 
Remand White Paper is regarded as a positive 
development that was intended to clarify a range 
of uncertainties of a legal and practical nature.
Despite its noble intentions, the Remand White 
Paper’s implementation, with specific reference 
to the size of the remand population and 
duration of their custody, is highly dependent 
on other role players. The remand detention 
problem has two main drivers: too many people 
are held on remand, and those on remand stay 
for too long before being acquitted or convicted. 
Of the roughly 155 000 prisoners in South Africa 
in 2016, approximately one-third were awaiting 
trial on any one day. Moreover, half of those 
on remand had been there for three months 
or longer.13 This situation is the result of large 
numbers of unnecessary arrests by the police, 
and a criminal justice process that is extremely 
slow and inefficient.14 These are factors outside 
the control of the DCS, but they become the 
department’s central problem: overcrowding 
in the large metropolitan remand detention 
facilities, such as Johannesburg, Durban 
Westville and Pollsmoor. With such severe 
overcrowding – above 175% occupancy – the 
good intentions of the Remand White Paper 
become unachievable and irrelevant. 
The 2011 amendment to the Correctional 
Services Act attempted to create a mechanism 
that would limit the duration of remand 
detention by means of section 49G. This was 
incorporated into the Remand White Paper, and 
stipulates that the DCS must refer a remand 
detainee to court before s/he completes a 
detention period of two years, and annually 
thereafter if the detainee remains in custody 
after the initial referral.15 
The 2013/14 DCS annual report noted that the 
average duration of custody had been reduced 
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by a modest 13 days since section 49G came 
into operation. While this may in part be due 
to other trends in the criminal justice system, 
the impact of the amendment has nonetheless 
been limited. As well-intentioned as section 49G 
may be, it will not have the desired effect, as it 
does not regulate the criminal justice process. 
Indeed, judicial review should be mandatory far 
sooner than two years. It should furthermore 
not be assumed that if a head of centre brings 
a section 49G case to court that the court 
will indeed undertake an investigation into an 
unduly delayed trial in terms of the provisions 
of the Criminal Procedure Act.16 Plainly put, 
the Correctional Services Act does not tell the 
court what to do with a section 49G case. 
Moreover, the constitutional right to a speedy 
trial is rendered meaningless when it takes two 
years before a delayed matter is brought to the 
attention of the court.17
If the Remand White Paper is to have an 
impact, the remand population has to be 
drastically reduced. This would necessitate 
the support and cooperation of the police, 
the National Prosecuting Authority (NPA) and 
the courts. The DCS framework and practice 
are simply not able to reduce the remand 
population. What is required is an interlinked, 
overarching framework covering the police, 
DCS, NPA and courts to ensure that suspects 
are not unnecessarily detained and that 
their cases are dealt with expeditiously, as 
recommended by the NDP. Ten years after 
Jali, the systemic causes of overcrowding 
remain unaddressed.
Gang management strategy and 
policy on sexual violence
The Jali Commission was extremely critical of 
how the department had failed to deal with 
prison gangs (and sexual violence), despite 
the ‘number gangs’ having been part of South 
African prisons for more than a century.18 It 
found that there was no strategy in place to 
deal with the disruptive, corrupting impact of 
prison gangs on prison administration. Only in 
the 2009/10–2013/14 DCS Strategic Plan did 
the department identify the need for a gang 
management strategy and set out a basic 
process to develop one. At last there was 
recognition in the strategic plan that change was 
necessary and that ignoring the problem would 
not make it disappear. However, the subsequent 
strategic plan (2013/14–2016/17) mentioned 
gangs as a threat to prisoner safety, but did not 
mention a gang management strategy as such. 
The 2014/15 DCS annual report provided no 
proper description of the gang management 
strategy, save for one reference to ‘Improved 
Implementation of Gang Management 
Strategy’ as a means to reduce inter-prisoner 
violence.19 The 2015/16 DCS annual report 
briefly mentioned that the ‘gang management 
checklist’ was implemented at ‘various centres’ 
and that a NICOC-led (National Intelligence 
Coordinating Committee) national gang 
management strategy was to be implemented.20 
Based on these reports, it appears that one of 
the most critical challenges to prisoner safety 
and good governance has been shifted on to 
the back burner. 
Sexual violence is a regrettable part of South 
Africa’s prison landscape, and is frequently, 
but not exclusively, linked to the number 
gangs. Gear and Ngubeni have given an 
authoritative account of the insidious nature of 
sexual violence in South Africa’s prisons and 
the devastating consequences for survivors.21 
Jali described it as ‘the horrific scourge of 
sexual violence that plagues our Prisons where 
appalling abuses and acts of sexual perversion 
are perpetrated on helpless and unprotected 
prisoners’.22 The Jali Commission was 
appalled at how the DCS had failed victims 
of sexual violence and how some warders 
were complicit in sexual violence, including the 
trafficking of prisoners. 
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Seven years later, in 2013, the DCS adopted 
a policy on the prevention of sexual violence, 
which had been developed in cooperation 
with two non-governmental organisations.23 
However, the 2014/15 and 2015/16 DCS 
annual reports made no mention of the strategy 
or of the implementation of any measures 
relating to the reduction of sexual violence 
among prisoners. Public recognition by the DCS 
of the problem, and of the policy document, 
has been scant and it appears to be similarly 
sitting on the back burner next to the gang 
management strategy. 
The department’s reluctance to deal with 
sexual violence in a concerted manner 
is inexplicable. The legislative framework 
is more than adequate, and the problem 
well-documented. Yet there remains little 
political recognition or condemnation of the 
problem, nor is the department fostering an 
environment where victims are taken seriously 
and supported, and active steps are taken to 
prevent sexual victimisation.
In respect of both these strategies it must be 
concluded that they are not priorities for the 
DCS, despite the constitutional right that all 
persons be free from all forms of violence.24 The 
DCS has a particular responsibility in this regard 
as it has a legal obligation to ensure the safe 
and humane custody of all prisoners.25 
Delivery on targets
The Jali Commission did not focus specifically 
on departmental performance against set 
targets, but the range of problems identified, 
especially in relation to poor governance 
and maladministration, should be seen in 
this context. While the Jali Commission paid 
particular attention to widespread corruption 
and maladministration, the overall intention 
was, and is, to have a department that is well-
managed, efficient in resource utilisation, and 
fulfilling its mandate with particular reference to 
service delivery. 
The DCS Strategic Plan, together with the 
annual reports, sets out the plans and targets 
for the medium term, as is generally required 
across the public service. In 2010 the auditor 
general started to include performance targets 
in his audits, the results of which are not 
particularly encouraging in the case of the DCS. 
In his 2011/12 report he noted that there were 
numerous problems with the quality of the 
information that was presented and made some 
critical remarks in this regard: 
Treasury Regulation 5.2.4 requires that 
the strategic and annual performance plan 
should form the basis for the annual report, 
therefore requiring the consistency of 
indicators between planning and reporting 
documents. A total of 22% of the reported 
indicators were not consistent with the 
indicators as per the approved strategic 
and annual performance plan. This is 
due to the lack of alignment between the 
Strategic Plan indicators and the Annual 
Performance Plan indicators.26 
The auditor general’s 2014/15 report expressed 
substantive concerns about the validity of 
information in the DCS annual report regarding 
the performance of the incarceration and 
rehabilitation programmes; non-compliance 
with material legislation; accuracy of financial 
statements; strategic planning and performance 
management; internal auditing; failure to 
constitute an audit committee; control of 
irregular expenditure; revenue management; 
filling of vacancies; poor leadership of the 
accounting officer; and weak financial and 
performance management.27 
The issues raised by the auditor general are 
not new. Since 1994 the DCS has not received 
an unqualified audit, although the subject and 
number of qualifications have changed over the 
years. When the basic requirements of public 
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administration, emphasising transparency and 
accountability, are not being complied with, it is 
unlikely that a human rights culture will flourish, 
and that prisoners will receive the services 
they are entitled to or be treated in a manner 
consistent with constitutional requirements.28  
While criticism should rightly be levelled at 
the DCS’s senior management in respect of 
planning, it should also be held accountable 
for not holding officials to their set and 
largely modest performance targets. Good 
performance appears to be a function of 
individual managers at operational levels and 
is not being driven by generally applicable 
legislation and policy. Between 2006 and 2016, 
there seems to have been limited progress in 
creating a department that is well-managed and 
performance-driven.
Governance 
Widespread corruption in the DCS was a 
central reason for the Jali Commission’s 
establishment in 2001. In 2002 the DCS 
approached the Special Investigations Unit (SIU) 
to assist it in rooting out corruption.29 The SIU 
achieved significant successes and played a 
substantial role in turning the ‘captured ship’ 
around. There is no doubt that the DCS and 
SIU cooperation helped reduce corruption 
and resulted in enormous savings to the tax 
payer.30 The Jali Commission made extensive 
recommendations regarding poor governance 
and maladministration in respect of every focal 
area it investigated. Essentially these were 
aimed at regaining control over a department 
that had been captured by organised labour at 
all levels, including at head office. Whether petty 
corruption has been brought under control is not 
known, but, as illustrated below, some events 
suggest that high-level corruption remains.
In November 2009 the SIU reported to the 
Portfolio Committee on Correctional Services 
on its findings, following an investigation into 
four major contracts awarded by the DCS to 
the Bosasa group of companies.31 The findings 
were damning, implicating DCS Chief Financial 
Officer Patrick Gillingham and former National 
Commissioner Linda Mti. The four contracts were 
awarded in similarly irregular ways, deviating 
from the Treasury Supply Chain Management 
Policy. The SIU’s final report was handed to the 
minister of correctional services and the NPA 
in September 2009, but at the time of writing 
(November 2016) no criminal prosecutions had 
been initiated. The chief financial officer was 
suspended in September 2010 and ultimately 
resigned without facing departmental disciplinary 
action.32 Mti subsequently took up a position at 
the Nelson Mandela Bay Metro. 
In June 2016, the Democratic Alliance (DA) 
motivated to have Mti’s appointment at the metro 
overturned, as he was implicated in corruption 
and also convicted of drunk driving, but nothing 
happened in this regard. By June 2016 the NPA 
had not yet responded to questions from the DA 
regarding the prosecution of Mti – despite the 
fact that the findings of the SIU clearly implicated 
senior DCS officials and a prima facie case for 
prosecution undoubtedly existed.33 One should 
not forget that the allegedly corrupt awarding of 
the high value contracts to Bosasa happened 
at a time when the ink had barely dried on the 
Jali Commission’s final report. There are thus 
clear indications not only that some senior DCS 
managers are protected by other elites but also 
that criminal investigations hold little weight when 
one enjoys political protection. The lack of action 
from the NPA clearly communicates that some 
people can and do get away with crime.
In April 2016, the Office of the Chief Procurement 
Officer for the DCS ordered National 
Commissioner Zach Modise to cancel the 
awarding of a tender valued at R378 million to a 
company called Integritron. Integritron has links 
to the ruling party, and one of its subsidiaries is a 
benefactor of the ANC.34 The chief procurement 
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duties that infringed on their dignity. It appeared 
to the commission that warders were generally 
of the opinion that prisoners were in prison 
‘for punishment’ and not ‘as punishment’.38 
Regrettably, it remains the case that large 
volumes of human rights violations are still 
reported in the DCS and Judicial Inspectorate for 
Correctional Services (JICS) annual reports, and 
that Jali’s remarks remain by and large true.  
It is not within the scope of this article to provide 
details on human rights violations – the DCS 
annual reports and the JICS do so adequately. 
A few key indicators are, however, worthy of 
mention. In 2014/15 the JICS inspected 90 
prisons and found that 61 exceeded 100% of 
their capacity, 21 exceeded more than 150% 
of their capacity, and 10 more than 175%.39 In 
2014/15 more than 3 150 prisoners alleged that 
they had been assaulted by officials; an increase 
of more than 3 000 compared to 2011/12.40 
Reported intra-prisoner violence increased from 
fewer than 4 000 cases in 2011/12 to 7 388 
cases in 2014/15, despite the prison population 
being relatively stable since 2008.41 
Poor conditions of detention are a major source 
of prisoner complaints to the JICS. In 2014/15 
nearly 34 000 complaints of this nature were 
recorded.42 Other major sources of complaints 
relate to nutrition, access to reading material, 
healthcare and access to legal representation. 
A total of 57 175 complaints regarding 
healthcare were recorded by the JICS in 
2014/15, an increase of 67% from 2011/12.43 
The profile of complaints has also remained 
remarkably consistent from one year to the 
next, indicating that they are not regarded 
as systemic problems and consequently not 
addressed in a systemic manner.
Conclusion
The overall impression gained is that many of the 
problems identified by the Jali Commission 10 
years ago are still present in the prison system. 
officer found several irregularities in the awarding 
of the contract. As more information emerged, 
the minister of justice and correctional services, 
the minister of finance, Treasury and the 
auditor general became involved in a public 
spat. Ultimately, Minister of Finance Pravin 
Gordhan instructed his counterpart in Justice 
and Correctional Services, Michael Masutha, to 
cancel the deal, upon which Integritron obtained 
an interdict against the minister of justice and 
correctional services to refrain from taking any 
action that would affect the deal until the matter 
was properly adjudicated by a court.35 The 
matter was subsequently placed on the ordinary 
roll, after an initial application to be heard on an 
urgent basis.
To add to the department’s woes, in April and 
May 2016, Zuma proclaimed two cases for 
the SIU to investigate. These cases related 
to irregularities in the procurement of an 
electronic monitoring system and irregularities 
in the appointment of a service provider 
to render project management services 
and condition assessments in respect of 
correctional facilities.36
Again, a key oversight function, namely that of 
the chief procurement officer, was undermined 
by forces of a political nature in the DCS. 
Whether the Integritron case will go the same 
route as the Bosasa case remains to be seen, 
but it is nonetheless clear that high-level 
corruption has not disappeared from the DCS. 
Human rights
The Jali Commission found ample evidence of 
officials treating prisoners as though they had no 
rights.37 While the commission acknowledged 
that overcrowding in prisons makes the 
protection of human rights very difficult, it rightly 
did not accept this as an excuse for the torture 
and ill-treatment of prisoners. The commission 
found that prisoners were subjected to torture, 
assault and abuse, and made to perform 
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While overcrowding is largely a problem 
created outside of the department’s control, 
rights violations such as assaults by officials, 
inter-prisoner violence, access to healthcare 
and other support services are very much 
within the department’s control. Based on the 
figures reported above, it also appears that 
the situation is getting worse. It is in particular 
egregious rights violations such as assault and 
torture that are not thoroughly investigated and 
thus create a situation of de facto impunity.44 It 
is indeed a rare occurrence that DCS officials 
are criminally prosecuted for human rights 
violations perpetrated against prisoners. To 
the best knowledge of the author, there has 
not yet been a successful prosecution against 
a state official for the crime of torture since it 
was criminalised in 2013.
Ten years after the Jali Commission released 
its report, the DCS remains beset by the 
same problems as those the commission 
was established to address: overcrowding, 
corruption, impunity, rights violations and 
services that do not reach sufficient numbers 
of prisoners and leave much to be desired 
with regard to impact. All indications are that 
there have been significant improvements in 
the DCS, especially regarding corruption and 
maladministration, but that there is plenty 
that remains unacceptably dysfunctional. 
The Bosasa and Integritron cases are 
testimony to this, as are the 2016 
proclaimed investigations. 
This brief review of the DCS 10 years after the 
Jali Commission demonstrates the medium-
term limitations of judicial commissions of 
inquiry. For the Jali Commission to have a 
sustained impact it needed the support of 
Parliament, which it lost in 2014 when the 
Portfolio Committee on Correctional Services 
was merged with the Portfolio Committee on 
Justice. Since then it appears that, in part due 
to this reconstituted committee’s workload, 
the Correctional Services portfolio has been 
shifted to the background. This is of particular 
concern, considering that the DCS has an 
almost allergic reaction to external criticism, 
oversight and accountability. 
Gross human rights violations continue to 
occur and may even be increasing. This is 
reason for deep concern. If the department 
is to have one priority for the next 10 years, 
it should be to address rights violations 
and the culture of de facto impunity. 
Good governance and human rights are 
inter-connected and mutually reinforcing, 
and compliance with the Bill of Rights 
necessitates a well-managed organisation. 
To comment on this article visit 
http://www.issafrica.org/sacq.php
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